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THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT AND THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE:

Arsenaux v. Arsenaux

Plaintiff wife sued for a separation from her husband on the grounds
of abandonment. Alleging freedom from fault, she sought alimony, and
additionally sought custody of a minor child and child support. The husband reconvened seeking a divorce on the grounds of adultery. In order
to establish his claim, the husband sought to prove that his wife had
become pregnant some two years following his vasectomy and had
thereafter obtained an abortion. His effort was frustrated by the wife's
successful assertion in the trial court that the medical records of her alleged
abortion fell within the health care provider privilege for civil cases and
her constitutional right to privacy. The husband successfully appealed from
the trial court's judgment in favor of the wife.' The Louisiana Supreme
Court, in a four to three decision, reversed and held that the medical
record in question is a communication under the explicit wording of the
health care provider statute and, as such, should not be admitted. The
court determined that the case did not fall within any of the statutory
exceptions to the privilege. The court also based its decision upon a consideration of the wife's constitutional right to privacy.' The three dissenters
argued that the wife had waived her privilege to have the evidence excluded by alleging freedom from fault.
Arsenaux v. Arsenaux, 428 So. 2d 427 (La. 1983).
The supreme court's decision in Arsenaux represents the prevailing
of Louisiana's physician-patient privilege3 over full factual disclosure in
a case involving adultery, abortion, and a vasectomy. By asserting the
statutory privilege, the wife was able to show freedom from fault and
consequently collect alimony despite the availability of evidence of the
wife's abortion under circumstances which indicate adultery. This result
seems inequitable and necessitates an evaluation of the physician-patient
privilege. Generally, the privilege operates quite effectively and produces
inequitable results only in extraordinary circumstances. However, the clear
wording of the statute limits the options available to the judiciary to
remedy those certain situations in which the privilege leads to a harsh
result. As evidenced by Arsenaux, some corrective action is necessary to

Copyright 1984, by Louisiana Law Review.
1. The court of appeal reversed the judgment of the trial court on the ground that
the statutory privilege and the constitutional right to privacy had been waived by the wife's
contention that she was free. from fault and consequently eligible to receive alimony. Arsenaux
v. Arsenaux, 417 So. 2d 856 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
2. Although the court's considerations relative to the wife's right to privacy weighed
upon its decision, the constitutional aspects of Arsenaux are beyond the scope of this note
as is the family law aspect.
3. Although Louisiana's health care provider statute is much broader than a general
physician-patient privilege in that it covers many health care providers, the two phrases
will be used interchangeably in this note.
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avoid injustice, and since the judiciary is clearly bound by the plain
language of the statute, the solution must come from the legislature.
Louisiana's Physician-PatientPrivilege
Prior to the enactment' of Louisiana's health care provider statute,
contained in Louisiana Revised Statute 13:3734,1 Louisiana did not
recognize any physician-patient privilege in civil cases. 6 The statute provides that a party in a civil case has a privilege to have any communication made to a health care provider which relates to the party's medical
treatment or diagnosis kept confidential.' The statute also recognizes certain specific exceptions to the privilege.' The privilege in criminal cases

4. Although no physician-patient privilege existed at common law, two-thirds of the
states have enacted some sort of statutory privilege. Those states without statutory privileges
include Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, and Vermont. Three other states, Alabama, Connecticut, and New Hampshire, have modified the common law rule of no privilege to an extent.
5. La. R.S. 13:3734 (Supp. 1983) provides in pertinent part:
B. Except as hereinafter provided, in civil cases, proceedings before a medical
review panel, pursuant to R.S. 40:1299.47 and in medical and dental arbitration
proceedings, pursuant to R.S. 9:4230-4236, and in proceedings and investigation
preliminary to all such actions, a patient or his authorized representative has a
privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent a health care provider from disclosing any communication, wherever made, relating to any fact, statement or opinion which was necessary to enable that health care provider or any other health
care provider to diagnose, treat, prescribe or act for the patient.
6. See Moosa v. Abdalla, 248 La. 344, 178 So. 2d 273 (1965); See also Pugh, The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966 Term-Evidence, 26 La. L. Rev.
606, 614 (1966).
7. The following excerpt describes the circumstances giving rise to the privilege:
To give rise to the privilege, a physician must be employed in his professional
capacity by a patient. The privilege does not apply when a physician makes an
examination pursuant to a court order. Nor does the admission of hospital records
into criminal proceedings violate the privilege. Finally, information communicated
to a physician in an effort to obtain illegal narcotics is not privileged.
Comment, Competent Opinions and Privileges, 21 Loy. L. Rev. 422, 446 (1975); See also
Comment, The Physician-Patient Privilege in Louisiana and its Limitations, 31 Tul. L. Rev.
192 (1956).
8. La. R.S. 13:3734(c) (Supp. 1983) provides:
C. There shall be no privilege for any communication under this Section where:
(1) Either before or after probate, upon the contest of any will executed, or
claimed to have been executed, by such patient, or after the death of such patient, in any action involving the validity of any instrument executed, or claimed
to have been executed by him, conveying or transferring any immovable or movable
property, any health care provider who has attended said patient may disclose
any communication regarding the patient which was necessary to enable him to
diagnose, treat, prescribe or to act for such deceased.
(2) After the death of the patient, the executor of his will, or the administrator
of his estate, or the surviving spouse of the deceased, or if there be no surviving
spouse, the children of the deceased personally, of if minors, by their representative, may give such consent, in any action or proceeding brought to recover
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is similar but is not as broad and contains no list of exceptions.'
The enactment of the health care provider statute in 1968 caused
substantial change in Louisiana law. In one pre-1968 decision the Louisiana Supreme Court permitted one parent in a heavily contested custody
case to gain access to the psychiatric records of the other parent despite
objections that the material was privileged."0 Since the statute's enactment,
however, this type of information has been excluded under the physicianpatient privilege. ' ' Louisiana courts have consistently interpreted the civil
statute as prohibiting a physician from testifying without the patient's consent as to any information acquired in attending the patient unless the

damages on account of the death of the patient, to permit any health care provider who may have attended said patient at any time to disclose any communication regarding said patient which was necessary to enable him to diagnose, treat,
prescribe or act for such deceased.
(3) If any person brings an action to recover damages, in tort or for worker's
compensation under federal or state laws, for personal injuries, such action shall
be deemed to constitute a consent by the person bringing such action that any
health care provider who has attended such person at any time may disclose any
communication which was necessary to enable him to diagnose, treat, prescribe
or act for said patient.
(4) The bringing of an action, to recover for the death of a patient, by the
executor of his will, or by the administrator of his estate, or by the surviving
spouse, or if there be no surviving spouse, by the children personally, or if minors,
by their representative, shall constitute a consent by such executor, administrator,
surviving spouse, or children or representative to the disclosure of any communication by any health care provider who may have at any time attended said deceased.
(5) If any health care provider reasonably believes in good faith that any legal
proceeding enumerated in Paragraphs (3) or (4) under this Subsection, has or
may be instituted for or on behalf of said patient, such health care provider may
disclose any communication acquired by him which was necessary to enable him
to diagnose, treat, prescribe or act for said patient.
D. Any action or proceeding described in Subsection C of this Section which
constitutes a consent for a health care provider to testify at a trial on the merits
shall be deemed a consent for purposes of any discovery method authorized by
Articles 1421 et seq. of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.
9. La. R.S. 15:476 (1981) provides:
No physician is permitted, whether during or after the termination of his employment as such, unless with his patient's express consent, to disclose any communication made to him as such physician by or on behalf of his patient, or the result
of any investigation made into the patient's physical or mental condition, or any
opinion based upon such investigation, or any information that he may have gotten by reason of his being such physician; provided, that the provisions of this
article shall not apply to any physician, who, under the appointment of the court,
and not by a selection of the patient, has made investigation into the patient's
physical or mental condition; provided, further, that any physician may be crossexamined upon the correctness of any certificate issued by him.
10. Moosa v. Abdalla, 248 La. 344, 178 So. 2d 273 (1965).
11. Wing v. Wing, 393 So. 2d 285 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); discussed in Pugh &
McClelland, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-Evidence, 42 La. L. Rev. 659, 667 (1982).
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action falls within one of the enumerated exceptions to the health care
provider statute.12
Exposition and Resolution of the Problem
Although confidential communications are generally not protected
from disclosure, certain privileges are recognized. For example, communications that are deemed privileged in Louisiana, in addition to physicianpatient communications, include those between an attorney and his client, 3 ,
a husband and wife," a clergyman and his penitent,' 5 and a newspaperman and his sources.' 6 By their very nature, testimonial privileges hinder
the full disclosure of all relevant evidence.' Commentators argue that
the physician-patient privilege, as well as the other testimonial privileges,
encourages fraud"R and that the privilege is unnecessary since in only very
few instances is the communication actually intended to be confidential. 9

12. Vincent v. Lemaire, 370 So. 2d 190 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Wing v. Wing, 393
So. 2d 285 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Heable v. Heable, 248 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1971).
In interpreting the criminal statute, however, the courts have not felt as strictly bound
by the clear wording of the statute. In State v. Berry, 324 So. 2d 822 (La. 1975), the defendant, on trial for murder, pled not guilty by reason of insanity. The state proffered evidence
concerning the defendant's mental condition over his objection that the information fell
under the physician-patient privilege. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's admission of the evidence stating that "the waiver may also result from other circumstances by
which the patient impliedly waives his right to claim the privilege." 324 So. 2d at 827.
The supreme court again disregarded the express consent requirement contained in the
criminal statute in State v. Aucoin, 362 So. 2d 503 (La. 1978). Once again the court was
confronted with a defendant, convicted of murder, who pled not guilty by reason of insanity. The court acknowledged that an implied waiver does not have a place within the
clearly worded requirements of the criminal medical privilege and concluded that this was
not a waiver since the defendant clearly did not wish to waive anything. However, the court
was of the opinion that the defendant's inconsistent posture of pleading insanity while invoking the privilege resulted in an imptied restriction on his use of the privilege which
prevented its assertion under these circumstances. Although the court used a slightly different analysis in Aucoin than in Berry, its intention was the same, namely, to prevent
injustice by limiting the application of the privilege.
13. La. Civ. Code art. 2283; La. R.S. 15:475 (1981).
14. La. R.S. 15:461 (1981) (criminal only).
15. La. R.S. 15:477 (1981) (criminal only).
16. La. R.S. 45:1452 (1982).
17. See Pugh & McClelland, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983 -Evidence, 44 La.
L. Rev. 335, 345 (1983).
18. For example, Professor McCormick stated: "More than a century of experience
with the statute has demonstrated that the privilege in the main operates not as the shield
of privacy but as the protector of fraud. Consequently the abandonment of the privilege
seems the best solution." McCormick, Evidence § 105, at 228 (2d ed. 1972).
19. For example, Professor Wigmore stated: "From asthma to broken ribs, from ague
to tetanus, the facts of the disease are not only disclosable without shame, but are in fact
often publicly known and knowable by everyone-except the appointed investigators of truth."
5 Wigmore, Evidence § 2380, at 207 (2d ed. 1923).
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The reason for allowing this hinderance to the disclosure of evidence,
however, is that at times society demands that the fact-finding role of
the law yield in order to protect other rights which are equally or more
highly valued."0 This suppression of the truth places an onerous burden
upon the judicial system and arguably should only be tolerated, if at all, 2'
when the societal need clearly outweighs the harm done by withholding
relevant evidence from the fact-finder. 22 Professor Wigmore, after generally
evaluating the existence of privileges as an exception to the policy of providing the court with all necessary facts, developed four fundamental conditions which are necessary to the establishment of a testimonial privilege:
(1) the communication must be intended to be confidential; (2) the relationship must be one to which the confidentiality of the communication
is essential; (3) the relationship must also be one which the public deems
worthy of protecting; and (4) the injury resulting from disclosure of the
communication must outweigh the injustice resulting from nondisclosure.
A privilege should be recognized only when these four conditions are
present.
Since no common-law privileges exist in Louisiana, it is only through
legislative action that a privilege can be enacted. Once the legislature has
spoken, the judiciary must apply the statute within the bounds of discretion permitted by law.24 Although the Louisiana legislature has clearly
manifested its will in enacting the health care provider statute, the wisdom
of their decision may certainly be questioned. In applying Wigmore's four
conditions to the physician-patient privilege, only the third criterion is
clearly present-namely, that the relationship is one which the public deems
worthy of protecting.23
20. See Note, Evidence-Privileged Communication- Physician-Patient PrivilegeLouisiana Civil Procedure, 12 Loy. L. Rev. 142, 144 (1965).
21. Professor Wigmore once stated: "it is certain that the practical employment of
the privilege has come to mean little but the suppression of useful truth-truth which ought
to be disclosed and would never be suppressed but for the sake of any inherent repugnancy
in the medical facts involved." 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2380, at 831 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
22. See McCormick, Evidence § 72, at 151 (2d ed. 1954).
23. 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 2287, at 7 (2d ed.1923).
24. The Louisiana Supreme Court stated: "When a law is clear and free from all ambiguity, we are not at liberty to disregard the letter of it, under the pretext of pursuing
its spirit." Hibernia Nat. Bank v. Louisiana Tax Comm., 195 La. 43, 55, 196 So. 15, 18
(1940). See also State v. Vallery, 212 La. 1095, 34 So. 2d 329 (1948); State v. Maestri,
199 La. 49, 5 So. 2d 499 (1942). Civil Code articles 13-21 guide the judiciary in interpreting
code articles and statutes. Generally, these articles provide that when a law is clear, it should
be applied according to its plain meaning. Former Chief Justice Sanders stated: "No aids
for interpretation are needed. 'Candles are not to be lighted when the sun shines brightly.' "
Sanders, The Judge: The Extent and Limit of His Role in a Civil Law Jurisdiction, 50
Tul. L. Rev. 511, at 513 (1976).
25. Wigmore evaluated the physician-patient privilege in light of his four conditions
and concluded: "A negative answer to any one of these questions would leave the privilege
without support. In truth, all of them, except the third, may justly be answered in the
negative." 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 2380, at 206 (2d ed. 1923).
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Although there is a substantial policy interest in insuring that the public
receives the best health care possible, the other three criteria appear to
be lacking. In the vast majority of situations, the symptoms of the patient are not intended to be confidential. In fact, many ailments are readily
visible and are freely disclosed by the patient to friends and relatives.
As far as the second condition is concerned, one in need of physical care
would rarely be-deterred from seeking treatment by the fear of subsequent disclosure in court. Arguably, the fourth criterion, that the injury
to the relationship is greater than the injury to justice, is also not
satisfied.26 In most instances, the patient has no valid reason to keep his
physical condition private, and oftentimes his reason may actually be to
perpetrate a fraud on the court. In a personal injury action, for example,
the very fact which is sought to be protected is that the litigant was not
injured at all. 7 Even when a controversial topic such as abortion comes
into litigation, which a patient may legitimately wish to be kept confidential, the evidence of such medical treatment is often necessary for a fair
adjudication. In such a situation, the policy supporting disclosure of the
evidence increases greatly and, theoretically, confidentiality may be required to yield upon a balancing of the policy interests. Certainly in the
ordinary situation where there is very little concern that the communication remain private, the injury to justice by the exclusion of this evidence
outweighs any potential injury to the physician-patient relationship."8
The weaknesses of the physician-patient privilege are obvious, 29 but
the purpose of this note is not to advocate the abolition of the privilege."
Rather, the preceding discussion is intended to show that the physicianpatient privilege is unpopular with commentators for valid reasons and
to suggest that the legislature reevaluate the physician-patient privilege.
The role of the judiciary is to apply the statute as a manifestation of
26. See 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 2380, at 207 (2d ed. 1923): "But (4) that the injury
to that relation is greater than the injury to justice-the final canon to be satisfied-must
most emphatically be denied. The injury is decidedly in the contrary direction. Indeed, the
facts of litigation to-day are such that the answer can hardly be seriously doubted."
27. Id. at 207.
28. Id.
29. One commentator wrote: "In the few instances where honest patients do dread
disclosure of their physical condition by a doctor, their fear is not that the truth may some
day be fired from him in court, but that he may voluntarily spread the facts among his
friends and their's in conversation." Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served
by Closing the Doctor's Mouth?, 52 Yale L.J. 607, 617 (1943).
30. For discussions of the physician-patient privilege see L. DeWitt, Privileged Communications Between Physician and Patient (1958); R. Slovenko, Psychotherapy, Confidentiality, and Privileged Communication 20-24 (1966); Black, The Marital and Physician
Privileges-A Reprint of a Letter to a Congressman, 1975 Duke L.J. 45 (1975); Morgan,
Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testimony by Rules of Evidence, 16 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 285 (1943); Note, Physician-Patient Privilege, 27 La. L. Rev. 361 (1967); Note,
Medical Jurisprudence-Privileged Communications Between Physician and Patient-State
Regulation and Right to Privacy, 39 Tenn. L. Rev. 515 (1972).
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legislative will. Although the courts have recognized the problem with Louisiana's privilege, their hands are tied in that they 'cannot go beyond the
clear wording of the statute.'
The redactors of the health care provider statute have attempted to
address problem areas involving the physician-patient privilege by adopting a list of exceptional situations in which the assertion of the privilege
will not be permitted. 32 For example, when a litigant brings an action
to recover damages in tort for personal injuries, he is deemed to have
consented to the admission of relevant medical evidence. These exceptions resolve some of the problems with the privilege, but as evidenced
by Arsenaux, at least one more problem is not adequately dealt with by
the statute.33 Certainly the legislature could not be expected to anticipate
every situation in which it would be unfair for a litigant to invoke the
privilege, especially one as unique as that in Arsenaux. Rather, the
legislature must develop a more flexible statute which would give the
judiciary greater discretion.
By denying the husband the opportunity of presenting evidence of
his wife's abortion under circumstances which indicate adultery, the wife
in Arsenaux was able to show freedom from fault and consequently collect alimony. Although the inequity of the result is fairly obvious, the
majority was constrained by the language of the statute and could not
go through the evaluation necessary to determine whether the assertion
of the privilege was proper in this situation. Rather, the court correctly
adopted a literal interpretation of the health care provider statute, apparently being of the opinion that since the legislature spelled out the
cases in which the medical privilege is waived, any additional judiciallycreated exception would "contravene the statute and flout the law." 34 This
conclusion is supported by the fact that the statute is a fairly recent
manifestation of legislative will."
The legislature must act to give the judiciary the needed flexibility
31.
32.

See infra note 24.
See infra note 7.

33.
34.

See Heable v. Heable, 248 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971) for another example.
Arsenaux, 417 So. 2d at 430.

35. The holding in Arsenaux seems to indicate that there is little chance of the supreme
court finding a future litigant in a civil action to have impliedly waived his privilege, and
no circumstances will constitute a waiver unless they fall within one of the statutory exceptions. However, the court actually left this door open, albeit through obiter dicta, by sug-

gesting that because the wife's physical condition was not an essential element of her suit,
the court would not infer that she impliedly waived'the privilege. Therefore, if a future
litigant's physical condition is an essential element of his cause of action or defense the
court may very well find this party to have impliedly waived the privilege although the
action does not fall within one of the enumerated exceptions. The three dissenters in Arsenaux
believed that the wife had in fact made her freedom from fault an issue by seeking alimony,
thereby impliedly waiving the privilege. Consequently, all seven justices apparently agree
that an implied waiver is possible.
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to equitably resolve actions in which an essential issue in the action is
the existence of a mental or physical condition or ailment.36 Approximately
two-thirds of the states have enacted some sort of statutory privilege.37
These statutes vary widely as to wording and scope, but the enacting states
can be divided into three general categories. The first group includes states
which have enacted a strict statute which contains no list of exceptions.3"
The second group, by far the smallest, includes states such as Louisiana
which have enacted statutes containing some common exceptions.39 The
third group includes states which have more liberal provisions for waiver
of the privilege when the litigant takes an inconsistent posture which would
make it unfair to permit him to assert the privilege." In states falling
within the first two categories, problems similar to Arsenaux have arisen
and have promoted discussion. 4 In each instance, the commentators have
urged a liberalization of the waiver doctrine whether by judicial interpretation, if the statute lends itself to such interpretation, or by legislative
action if the statute leaves no room for interpretation, as is the case with
Louisiana's health care provider statute.
The Missouri Supreme Court had to deal with a strictly worded
statutory privilege which is very similar to Louisiana's criminal statute4 2
in that it contains no list of exceptions. Faced with situations in which
the plaintiff asserted a cause of action which placed his health at issue,
that court responded by adopting a liberal interpretation of that state's

36. Wigmore presented the following example illustrating a litigant's contradictory position in such a situation:
The whole reason for the privilege is the patient's supposed unwillingness that
the ailment should be disclosed to the world at large; hence the bringing of a
suit in which the very declaration, and much more the proof, discloses the ailment to the world at large, is of itself an indication that the supposed repugnancy
to disclose does not exist. By any other conclusion the law practically permits
the plaintiff to make a claim somewhat as follows: "I tender witnesses A, B,
and C, who will openly prove the severe nature of my injury. But I object to
the testimony of witness D, a physician called by the opponent to prove that
my injury is not so severe as I claim, because it is extremely repugnant to me
that my neighbors should learn the nature of my injury!" The position is especially
absurd when (as is often the case) the dreadful disclosure, which the privilege
prevents, is the fact that the plaintiff suffered no injury at all.
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2389, at 855 (T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
37. See infra note 4.
38. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2235 (1982); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 595.02(4)(1974) (Supp.
1984); Mo. Rev. Stat. 491.060(5)(1952) (Supp. 1984).
39. Idaho Code § 9-203(4)(1948) (Supp. 1984); La. R.S. 13:3734 (Supp. 1983).
40. Calif. Evid. Code § 990-996 (1966); Iowa Code Ann. § 622.10 (Supp. 1983-84).
41. See Hogan, Waiver of the Physician-Patient Privilege in Personal Injury Litigation, 52 Marq. L. Rev. 75 (1968); Copple, Physician-Patient Privilege: A Need to Revise
the, Arizona Law, 6 Ariz. L. Rev. 292 (1965); Comment, Waiver of the Physician-Patient
Privilege in Missouri, 13 St. L. L. J. 459 (1969).
42. See infra note 8.
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statute."3 The Louisiana Supreme Court is unable to liberally interpret
the health care provider statute since Louisiana's physician-patient privilege
contains a list of exceptions, and a judicial expansion of this list would
in effect create law. Therefore, the only solution in Louisiana is for the
legislature to amend the statute.
Federal Rule of Evidence 501" deals with privileged communications.
This rule provides that in criminal cases the federal common law, as interpreted in the light of reason and experience, will apply. In civil actions
and proceedings, state privilege law applies in situations in which the state
law supplies the rule of decision. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504"5,
relative to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, was not accepted. However,
this rule and those based upon it are pertinent to the present discussion
in that they provide an excellent example of an exception which could
easily be added to Louisiana's health care provider statute and which would
allow the courts to equitably deal with any possible situation which may
arise in the future. This exception would relieve the legislature of the impossible task of attempting to anticipate every situation in which an exception to the physician-patient privilege would be proper by providing
that the privilege would be waived whenever the litigant proceeds in such
a manner that his health becomes a material issue. Uniform Rule of
Evidence 50346 corresponds exactly to proposed Federal Rule of Evidence
504, except that the former makes provision for a physician-patient
privilege rather than limiting the scope of the statute to psychotherapists
as was done in the latter. Subdivision (d)(3) of the Uniform Rule provides:
(3) Condition on element of claim or defense. There is no
privilege under this rule as to communications relevant to an issue
of the [physical,] mental . . . or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which he relies upon the condition as
an element of his claim or defense or, after the patient's death,
in any proceeding in which any party relies upon the condition
as an element of his claim or defense.
In fairness and to avoid abuses, the patient, by injecting his condition
into litigation, must be said to have waived the privilege.
The states which have adopted provisions similar to this subdivision47

43. State ex rel McNutt v. Keet, 432 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. 1968). In Keet the Missouri
Supreme Court held that once the matter of a plaintiff's physical condition is an issue under
the pleadings, the plaintiff will be considered to have waived the statutory physician-patient
privilege, insofar as information from doctors or medical and hospital records bearing on
that issue are concerned.
44, Fed. R. Evid. 501.
45. Fed. R. Evid. 504 (Proposed Official Rule 1973).
46. Unif. R. Evid. 503.
47. Alaska's privilege, Alaska Rules of Evidence, Rule 504 (1979), is similar to the
uniform rule, as are the rules adopted by Florida (Fla. Stat. Ann., Evidence Code § 50.503
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have allowed their courts the flexibility to insure that in situations involving the medical privilege, the interests of justice are kept paramount
without forcing the courts to elect between creating a fiction in order
to circumvent the clear wording of the statute or allowing an injustice.
This type of exception would make certain that private communications
will be exposed only when relevant to the matter before the court and
only to the extent necessary to reach a fair adjudication. The social policy
underlying the privilege-namely, insuring that the public receives the best
health care possible-will still be advanced while the injury to the judicial
system by the exclusion of relevant evidence will be lessened. 8 The Louisiana legislature could adopt a similar provision, and in doing so would
untie the hands of the courts and allow them to equitably resolve difficult decisions such as the one presented in Arsenaux.
Conclusion
Louisiana courts have been placed in a dilemma in applying the civil
and criminal statutes dealing with the relationship between physician and
patient. In criminal cases, the supreme court has prevented inequities by
creating the implied waiver of the privilege in situations in which it would
be unfair to allow its assertion. In civil cases, society has had to bear
results which seem inequitable. This dilemma cannot be resolved by a
judiciary that is confined within the clear wording of a recently enacted
statute. The problem must be solved by the legislature, and this can be
done by a complete reevaluation of the physician-patient privilege and
the adoption of a provision similar to subdivision (d)(3) of Uniform Rule
of Evidence 503. Such a provision would limit the scope of the privilege
by creating a broader exception and would provide the judiciary with the
needed discretion to equitably resolve cases involving the physician-patient
privilege.
Greg Gerard Guidry
(1975)), Arkansas (Ark. Stat. Ann. § 28.1001, Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 503 (1979)),
Maine (Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Maine Rules of Evidence, Rule 503 (Supp. 1978)), North Dakota
(N.D. Rules of Evidence, Rule 523 (Supp. 1933)), Oklahoma (Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 12,
§ 2503(1780) (Supp. 1983-84)), and South Dakota (S.D. Rules of Evidence, § 19-13-3 (1923)).
Nevada (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 49.215 (1979)) and New Mexico (N.M. Stat. Ann., Rules of
Evidence, Rule 503 (1979)) have limited the application of the rule to psychotherapists.
48. A Justice on the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated the matter aptly in his dissent:
In the last analysis, therefore, this statute must be said to have been enacted to
save from shame and disgrace those who by their own acts have forfeited their
honor. If this could be done without at the same time working injustice to the
innocent and the pure, the purpose might be somewhat praiseworthy. But where
the innocent are made to suffer to shield the wicked and the guilty from the
publicity of their own misconduct, the cost of generous consideration becomes
too great.
Maine v. Maryland Cas. Co., 172 Wis. 350, 178 N.W. 749, 752 (1920).

